



RECONNAISSANCE

Spring 2014

The Newsletter of the Military History Society of New South Wales Incorporated

PATRON: Major General the Honourable Justice Paul Brereton AM RFD

PRESIDENT: Benjamin Howell – **SECRETARY:** John Twyford – **TREASURER:** Alan Kitchen

EDITOR: Harry Taplin – **PUBLISHER:** John Twyford

PRESIDENT'S REPORT

Welcome to the Spring 2014 edition of *Reconnaissance*, and the last for 2014.

NEW PATRON

At this time I would also like to announce that we have a new Patron. Major General the Honourable Justice Paul Brereton AM RFD has kindly accepted our invitation to become Patron and on behalf of the Society I wish him a very warm welcome and look forward to his active involvement and would ask all of you to wish him a warm welcome to the Society.

Justice Brereton was admitted as a solicitor in New South Wales in 1982, was called to the Bar in 1987, and appointed Senior Counsel in 1998. He was appointed a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 2005, where he is assigned to the Equity Division and is the Corporations List Judge and the Adoptions List Judge. He is one of three joint authors of the current edition of Nygh's Conflict of Laws in Australia.

He enlisted in the Army Reserve in Sydney University Regiment in 1975, and was commissioned in the Royal Australian Infantry in 1979. He has served as Second-in-command Sydney University Regiment (1994-6), Commanding Officer 4th/3rd Battalion, the Royal New South Wales Regiment (1997-99), Chief of Staff 5th Brigade (2004-5), Assistant Chief of Staff Land Headquarters (2006-7), and Commander 5th Brigade (2008-10). He was promoted Major General in December 2010 on appointment to his current posting as Head, Cadet Reserve and Employer Support Division.

He was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia in the Military Division in 2010 for exceptional service as Chief of Staff 5th Brigade, Assistant Chief of Staff Land Headquarters and Commander 5th Brigade.

Justice Brereton is a member of the Defence Force Discipline Tribunal (appointed August 2013).

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the wonderful Dame Marie Bashir AD CVO for being our Patron for four years.

2015 PROGRAM

The items that we have scheduled / tentatively scheduled are listed after my report. As you can see there is a variety of topics, but there are two major anniversaries:

- The Centenary of the landings at Gallipoli in April 2015
- The Bicentenary of the Battle of Waterloo in June 2015.

A large undertaking will be the Gallipoli study day in April where we will have a number of speakers on this very important anniversary of our nation. Stay tuned for more details in the new year.

MEMBERSHIP

At our last Council meeting I stressed the importance of membership and that it needs to be the forefront of our strategy going forward. I also stated the need not only to attract new members, but to also service you (our existing members) much more effectively and efficiently, and in a manner that addresses the core of why you are interested in military history and what you expect and want from being a member of the MHSNSW.

In order to find out more about why you have joined the Society and to find out exactly what interests you about Military History, we have put together a membership survey for you to complete which should greatly aid us (broadly speaking) in identifying the following:

- Why you joined the MHSNSW.
- Why you continue to be a member.
- What you like about being a member of the MHSNSW.
- What you think is not done so well by the MHSNSW.
- What you think we should do more of.
- What you think we should do less of.

- The areas of military history are of specific areas are of interest to you and our broader membership so that we can do more that is reflective of interest to you our members.
- To identify what other functions / activities you think that the MHSNSW should perform / be involved with. For example at present we just do monthly lectures and that's about it, so what else should we be doing to reinvigorate the Society and to attract new members and an awareness of our Society and its brand? NB: We need to crawl before we walk, so with some things that we identify we may need to build the capability to perform these before we can do them (i.e. some things will not happen overnight).
- To see if we have subsets of our membership that have specific interests in periods of war / campaigns / personalities so that we can form small teams reflective of those interests for the purposes of preparing lectures or articles (for Renaissance and the website) related to those specialist areas e.g. the Crimean War, the Crusades, et al.

You will find a copy of the survey attached with this edition . I would very much encourage you all to complete this so that we can continue to improve and grow the Society, and to reflect the values of our members.

RECONNAISSANCE

As you may appreciate, to put together articles and book reviews is a lot of work, and to date the contributions and compilation of this newsletter is in a hands of a few but dedicated members of the Society.

A big thanks to Brigadier Carey and also to our great Secretary Dr Twyford for their work on this edition as we would not have had a Spring edition without their hard work.

I would ask all of you to consider how you may be of assistance in contributing to future editions of Reconnaissance, by way of research, articles, book reviews, et al. Please contact Dr Twyford if you would like to help.

CONCLUSION

On a final note I hope you have had a great 2014 with the Society and enjoyed the lectures and speakers that we have had. On behalf of the Society and myself personally, I wish to extend my best wishes for a safe and happy Christmas and New Year for your family, friends, and yourself. I look forward to seeing you all again at our January lecture.

BENJAMIN HOWELL

PROGRAM OF EVENTS – 2015

17 January	<i>First Victory: HMAS Sydney's hunt for the German raider SMS Emden</i> (Reprogrammed from August 2014)	Mr Mike Carlton
14 February	Annual General Meeting with Members' Day	N/A
14 March	<i>The Battle of Savo Island 8-9 August 1942</i>	by a lecturer to be selected
11 April	Gallipoli Study Day: A study of the Gallipoli Campaign including: The Landing, The August Offensive and The Withdrawal. A selection of guest lecturers including Mr Roger Lee (Army History Unit), Brigadier Chris Roberts (Author) and Dr Rhys Crawley (ANU) have now confirmed their participation.	
9 May	<i>The Invasion of the Sea Peoples</i>	by a lecturer to be selected
13 June	<i>The Battle of Waterloo: The Bicentenary</i>	by the President
11 July	<i>The RAAF in Korea 1950-1953</i>	by a lecturer to be selected
9 August	<i>The August Offensive at Gallipoli</i>	Dr Rhys Crawley
13 September	History Week – A subject may be selected to conform to the theme of History Week as advised by the History Council of NSW	
11 October	<i>The Charge of the Light Brigade 25 October 1854</i>	by a lecturer to be selected
9 November	Christmas Party & Quiz	N/A
December	Christmas Break	N/A

Please note that the Society meets on the second Saturday of the month at 2:00 pm, at an address to be notified

THE CROWN AND THE ARMED FORCES: A NON-POLITICAL SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE

INTRODUCTION

The position of the Crown in relation to the armed forces is a subject of particular relevance in the light of the origins, causes and outbreak of the Great War in 1914. We might consider it peripheral given the momentous events of 1914-1918, but the very difference between that relationship in Britain and France and the equivalents say in Germany and Austria-Hungary, is very stark. That difference is largely due to the democratic nature of the Allied states concerned.

The relationship of the Crown to the armed forces has generally been similar in all nation states over the course of human history. Those variations that have occurred can usually be seen clearly in times of revolution or insurrection. Given that the concept of the nation state in modern times is broadly a consequence of the Treaty of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, we should go back further to find the enduring sources of the relationship.

The current doctrine of joint operations presupposes that the three major arms of a defence force; navy, army and air force, will work together to achieve a common aim, and were developed from somewhat similar origins. This supposition is not necessarily valid. The British air force certainly emerged from both the navy and army, but most others developed from purely army origins.

What is more, those British origins give our Australian defence force a unique tradition; one which proceeds hand in glove with the evolution of political democracy.

We should therefore consider the navy and army's development separately in the first instance, and recognise that the Australian armed forces are direct descendants of their British counterparts.

THE NAVY

Legend has it that King Alfred the Great was the founder of the Royal Navy, and incidentally that is why the navy is the senior service. In reality these claims are not easily sustained. Alfred, firstly King of Wessex, was a sound strategic thinker and his greatest victory was the conquest of London in 886, but he was more of a soldier than sailor. The Danes withdrew to eastern England and the rest of the people accepted Alfred as king over all their lands. He built forts at strategic points and stationed a fleet of ships along the coast to protect his kingdom and guard against invasion. However ships in those days were hardly warships as we know them. They were probably little more than floating platforms capable of carrying armed men to fight in their usual way on less stable ground. In any event, Alfred was very likely not king of England but of Wessex only, and it fell to his grandson Athelstan to defeat a Viking-Scottish coalition at Brunanburh in Lancashire in 937. Athelstan was finally able to claim himself king of all England.

Well into late mediaeval times there was no 'royal' navy and no real warships. In time of war the king had a right to demand services of ships and men, taken of course from their routine occupations, and could merge these with what ever resources he might fund from his own pocket. Shrewd businessmen naturally saw opportunities for good profits to be made and consequently they, and often whole communities, entered into contract with the crown to furnish a specified force in return for tax incentives or trading rights. The Cinque Ports and Bristol are well known examples.

Merchant ships were intended for commerce and this solution proved expensive for the crown over time, especially as its appetite for territorial expansion grew. Henry V built his own fleet for his expedition to France but again, it was merely a means of transportation for his army. It was sold off after his death but the contractual system continued into Tudor times.

The best known maritime powers in the early to high Middle Ages were mainly the Mediterranean city states of Venice and Genoa, and the Ottoman Empire. They had navies, although they confined their activities mainly in the Mediterranean with occasional sorties onto the Atlantic coast of Europe. From around the time of the Crusades, national navies in western states seem to have begun to take on the role and political shape that we recognise today.

The office of Admiral, introduced in England around 1301 AD, did not originally confer authority to command at sea, but rather jurisdiction of a legal nature in maritime affairs and the authority to establish Courts of Admiralty. There were two Admirals initially; Admiral of the North and Admiral of the South. In order to give them authority to command at sea they were also appointed 'Captain General of our Fleets and Seas'. In 1391 the two offices were combined, later becoming Lord High Admiral of England, the ninth of the nine Great Officers of State. The Royal Navy as a political structure, an instrument of national policy, more likely has its origins in this period.

The latter half of the fifteenth century saw a dramatic growth in interest in maritime affairs in Western Europe. Inspired by the work of Portuguese Prince Henry the Navigator, most Christian monarchs along the Atlantic seaboard developed a proprietary interest in ships and the 'Great Ocean'. There were two major consequences: the building of deep hulled, low charged ships, powered by sail and capable of carrying substantial cargoes and stores; and advances in navigation and seamanship which permitted ships to traverse the deep oceans.

An opening up of the Americas, Africa and Asia followed inexorably. Trade with these new worlds grew quickly, as did the competition between maritime countries. These developments called for navies to control and defend the new routes and the trading monopolies, which were claimed by right of prior discovery. The international struggle for sea power had begun.

Not surprisingly, a parallel development of gunpowder and its application to artillery came to increase the political and strategic value of the deep-hulled, ocean going vessels. Gunfire was first experienced in Britain in 1327 when an English army marched north upon the Scots accompanied by an early type of cannon.

As artillery pieces developed it was obvious that the strong decks of deep-hulled sailing vessels could support the embarkation of cannon, especially once the latter could be mounted on wheeled carriages.

By the later stages of the English civil strife we know as the Wars of the Roses, it was equally obvious that the feudal nature of the political life of the state could no longer maintain any kind of stability. Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond and King Henry VII after the fall of his kinsman Richard III in 1485, determined to break the power and influence of the great magnates, the Tenants-in-Chief. He was largely successful in laying the foundations of the military supremacy of the monarch within the kingdom and strengthening the close link between the sovereign and the military establishment. Henry also took a serious interest in naval affairs and it was he who commissioned John Cabot to find a way to North America in 1497. His son, Henry VIII, was to take an even stronger approach.

The younger Henry created a standing fleet and both he and his father were responsible for establishing facilities that eventually became the great navy yards of Portsmouth, Deptford and Woolwich. By 1500 all the princes of northwest Europe, England, Scotland, France and Denmark were mounting a large campaign of naval rearmament, building massive fifteen hundred ton vessels. By 1547 Henry's fleet included fifteen 'great ships' and thirty eight smaller vessels.

This had already proven too big for one man to administer and in 1532 the civil administration of the navy was delegated from the Lord High Admiral to a committee, which by the time of Elizabeth I, had been designated The Navy Board. This situation continued until 1628 when the Lord High Admiral, the Duke of Buckingham was assassinated and the Lords Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral assumed his responsibilities for administration of the navy.

Since then the office has been revived on occasion, notably by James II. However, in 1964 on reorganisation of the services ministries, Elizabeth II assumed the title though not the office of Lord High Admiral. In 2011 the Queen appointed her husband, Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh to hold the title.

Notwithstanding all these developmental changes and remissions, the monarch has always been the titular, if not the actual, head of the Royal Navy, and by extension after Federation, the Royal Australian Navy. The relationship has always been close and a number of kings have been serving naval officers, two of them William IV and George VI in time of war.

THE ARMY

The relationship between monarchs and armies, on the other hand, has been far more problematic. Armies have been the agents of both making and unmaking monarchs. In tracing the relationship of monarchy to the army we must again go back to Alfred, where we find that rather than being just founder of a navy, he may better be regarded as father of an integrated defence force.

English resistance to the Viking invasions, from both Denmark and Norway, centred on Wessex. The willpower, energy and organisational ability of the Wessex kings, Alfred and his successors, lay at the heart of this resistance and laid the foundations of a flexible military system which placed the human and financial resources of the of the kingdom at the disposal of the crown.

The Vikings severely disrupted the territories they raided, but they rarely established a permanent state of their own. In Ireland they 'went native and threw themselves into the complex power struggles of the regional kings.' They proved useful allies, helping Brian Boru to defeat the forces of Leinster, although they fought on both sides of the Battle of Clontarf in 1014.

In Scotland the pressure from the Vikings, whose strongholds were located primarily in the remoter western and northern peripheries, helped forge a fusion between the Picts and the Scots of Dalriada. From this Kenneth MacAlpine was able to proclaim himself 'King of the Scots'.

By the time of the Norman invasion in 1066, Ireland and Scotland continued to be beset by inter-clan and tribal rivalries but the situation in England had settled down. Scotland, though a single monarchy, had still to extend its dominance over the Highlands and the Western Isles, where the magnates continued to mount raids against each other. Ireland continued to do the same, but was more fragmented into petty kingdoms and 'host to the culture of the blood-feud and cattle-raid'.

In England the apparatus developed by Alfred, his son Edward the Elder and grandson Athelstan, provided the wherewithal to mobilise local land and sea forces quickly and concentrate them in threatened areas.

Two important legal principles lay at the heart of their system: every freeman was responsible for the defence of his country in an emergency; and all land was held from the king who could demand service as a condition of tenure. These principles constituted the core of a kind of feudal system which was enhanced and codified by William I (The Conqueror) after 1066.

It is not appropriate here to go into the question of William's right to the throne of England, but simply to say he claimed the right personally, not on behalf of Normandy. Accordingly the 'feudal' aspects of the English polity after the Conquest are not based on the model of the old Frankish Empire of which Normandy was a part.

In the English tradition, the feudal nature of society and the law is unique and derives from both the old Anglo Saxon heritage and the common law developed after the Conquest, not from the old Salic Law of the Continent.

Nevertheless from the Conquest on, the feudal tenures supplied the king with troops. From a very early time two of the Great Officers of State, the Lord High Constable and the Earl Marshall, were the leaders of the king's army. In that respect they were empowered to administer martial law, particularly in cases of offences within the army.

At the same time the requirement to provide armed men for the king's service effectively allowed the barons and other magnates to maintain their own armed force, often a private army. In many instances this enabled them to oppose the king's will. This happened all too often and the last major conflict it fostered can be seen to be the dynastic wars of the Plantagenet family we know as the Wars of the Roses. Henry VII, on emerging victorious from this conflict, determined never to be faced with such a difficulty.

Henry Tudor was a tough, cold, shrewd and ruthless man. He kept the nobles in a state of fear by eliminating pretenders to the throne, increasing the political power of the wealthy middle classes and expanding England's influence abroad. His daughter became Queen of Scotland and his son married the Infanta Catherine, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. He made signal use of the Act of Attainder and created the Court of the Star Chamber. His use of these methods was surpassed only by his son Henry VIII. In effect they smashed the feudal power of the magnates.

At various times in the post-Conquest period monarchs found it necessary to have recourse to the system initiated by Alfred. Henry II preferred to spare the lives of his people by employing mercenaries in his foreign wars, but mercenaries and feudal levies were sometimes insufficient. In 1181 he revived and reorganised the ancient national force by his Assize of Arms. It seems that the idea of such a force had never ceased to exist and certainly it had never become law that military service, at least defensive service, was limited by the system of military tenure.

Henry III issued similar assizes and his son's (Edward I) Statute of Winchester took great effect in 1285. It is not necessary to go into the detail of the statute or the subsequent 'commissions of array' which stemmed from it, simply to recognise that these measures provided for the raising of a national army if required, for either offensive or defensive purposes.

There was still no standing army as we understand it. The army which Henry V used to win his victories in France consisted partly of volunteers who were paid the king's wages, and partly by forces of lords who served the king by indenture. During the Wars of the Roses both sides used the king's name in commissions of array and proceeded, often by extortion to acquire loans with which to pay for them.

The Wars represent a low point in chivalric behaviour and public administration, especially in so far as the Yorkist side tended to exercise the authority of martial law 'by giving the Lord High Constable extraordinary and draconian authority to proceed in all cases of treason summarily and plainly, without noise and show of judgment on simple inspection of fact'.

Henry VII would have none of this. He had no need because he could use the law effectively and his parliaments were usually amenable. Tudor despotism was not enforced by any standing army.

The Tudors might have been despots but they were not tyrants. A couple of companies of the Yeoman of the Guard and the Honourable Artillery Company with a few guards in the fortresses were the only soldiers that the king kept permanently in his pay. Commissions of array were issued from time to time to mount foreign wars, but these armies were essentially 'hostilities only' forces.

This principle seems to remain well into Stuart times: for foreign wars a temporary army is raised partly by virtue of feudal obligation, partly by voluntary enlistment and partly by impressment. An Act of Philip and Mary was said to authorise impressment by means of commissions of array.

However the major problem lay in the peoples' inherent mistrust of standing armies. Given the experiences the English people had in relation to soldiers and internal wars over several centuries, this is hardly surprising. In early Stuart times troops were not always disbanded on their return to England. They were kept active for nefarious reasons perhaps, but their bad behaviour on home soil and the policy of billeting them in local communities gave rise to considerable discontent.

The need for their strict discipline resulted in more commissions of martial law, empowering the commissioners to 'proceed according to the justice of martial law against such soldiers ... and other dissolute persons joining with them ... as commit any robberies, felonies, mutinies or other outrages or misdemeanours ... and then to execute and cause to be put to death according to the law martial'.

These commissions were always of dubious legality when considered against the Common Law, but as can be seen they went much further than matters of a military nature. The words 'other dissolute persons' were particularly ominous.

The Stuarts, at least in the male line, produced four notably bad kings in a row. James I was certainly tactless but he was a lot better than his foolish son and his unprincipled grandsons. The Tudors would probably have thought the difficulties the Stuarts created for themselves, laughable. Still they happened to come to the throne at a time of great international crisis, and proved singularly inept at handling it. Theirs was not the only troubled monarchy.

The feudal system had never been neat or orderly, and it was rarely efficient. From about the middle of the fourteenth century Europe had been plagued by wars and by the fifteenth century the feudal system had become very inefficient indeed. As John Keegan says, 'A condition approaching permanent warfare afflicted much of Europe, the result of both external threat and internal fractiousness, which the feudal armies could not suppress.

Attempts to make armed forces more effective, by conceding greater independence to landholders in the worst-troubled areas or paying knights to serve under arms, only heightened the problem; the landholders declined to muster when called, built stronger castles, raised private armies, waged war in their own right - sometimes against the sovereigns'; hence the Wars of the Roses. The Tudors put a stop to much of this in England through their appeal to the patriotism of the people and their severe containment of the nobility.

In Scotland the situation was as chaotic as it was on the Continent. The Stuarts were kings of both countries and could not even control their own homeland. The great constitutional crises which came to the surface during the reign of Charles I were to produce the mainstay of British democracy; the subordination of everyone, including the king, to the concept of the Crown in Parliament and the subsequent sub-concept of the King in Council.

It seems to have been increasingly accepted in the circumstances of the times, that a standing army was necessary; that the old county force provided by the Statute of Winchester (1285) and the associated commissions of array, now called the Militia, was no longer a satisfactory means of providing a defence force. But no armed force could be maintained for very long without funds.

The Stuarts were largely broke. Parliament had to be asked for money, but wanted some control over the agency for which the money was to be raised by taxation. Charles was in a bind. One of the first quarrels between them broke out over the issue of Ship Money to pay for the navy. Parliament would not back down, but the king eventually had his way. However their intransigence stiffened even more when it came to money for a standing army.

Space prohibits an account of the development of parliamentary democracy, but it is important to realise that the history of the army and the king's place in it, is closely interwoven in the process. At stake was the question of the command of the army and its place in a civil society, particularly the means for its administration and control.

Central to the causes of the Civil War was the question of who should control the army; the king or the parliament. And central to the Parliament's concerns was the fear that Charles would seek to use the army to enforce his personal rule without the constraints of the Parliament. According to one of the main points in the Nineteen

Propositions put to the king in 1642, he was required to assent to a bill putting the militia and all fortified places 'in such hands as parliament should appoint'. The Civil War of 1642-46 followed ending in Regicide.

Cromwell instituted the first standing army in Britain, the New Model Army. It became a military government after Cromwell had clashed with the parliament; a despised and vilified force of repression as some saw it, especially after the appointment of the major generals to control the eleven military districts. After the Restoration in 1660, parliament declared unequivocally that the king was the supreme governor of '... the militia and of all forces by sea and land', but it disbanded the army, still distrusted even by the new king.

All that was allowed were certain 'Guards and Garrisons', and when the garrisons were extracted the king was allowed to form a guard out of the residue. Nothing more was legalised until after the revolution of 1688. When Charles II said he was going to war in 1676, money was granted and appropriated, but war was not declared. One way or another Charles and his brother, James II, managed to retain an army on foot. James at one stage had about 16,000 men under arms.

By the time James was removed, a Bill of Rights had been produced which proclaimed that raising an army in time of peace without the consent of the parliament was against the law. However before the Bill of Rights was proclaimed, the first Mutiny Act was passed. It was this legislation which, over the next two centuries, permitted the raising of a standing army and prescribed in great detail, its manner of administration and regulation. Almost incredibly a new Mutiny Act was passed each year until 1879. This was the means by which parliament controlled the funding and administration of the army.

A very significant change appeared on the army's horizon in 1868 with the appointment of Edward Cardwell as Secretary of State for War. He had been Colonial Secretary and in that position had conceived a need to reform the army in line with the needs of a great imperial power. On becoming Secretary for War he began, and forced through, a series of far reaching changes including the abolition of purchase, introduction of the short service enlistment and the reorganisation of the regimental system. The shock to the army took many years to absorb and had still not settled down when another Secretary, Richard Haldane arrived in 1905. Perceiving the likelihood of war with the Central Powers, Haldane further reorganised the army and founded the Territorials.

A major consequence of Cardwell's reforms was the enactment in 1881 of the Army Act, which since then has formed the basis of the army we know today. The extent to which the Australian Parliament's Defence Act of 1903 followed and incorporated the imperial Act has been the basis of Australian Army organisation and administration ever since.

It would be entirely boring to go into the detail of the Army Act (or the Defence Act) or its subsequent history, especially since major modifications have been made in recent years to take account of modern philosophies of justice and human rights. Nevertheless it was a massive piece of legislation and one of very peculiar character in that it required another act to keep it in force. In effect the principle was maintained that the army might only be legalised from year to year. Suffice to say the Act lays down certain solid principles that are never varied:

- a. There can be no keeping a standing army in peacetime without the consent of parliament,
- b. There can be no punishment in peacetime under martial law,
- c. The subsequent acts implementing the Army Act further stipulated the number of soldiers that may be kept in service.

So the principles demanded of the Stuarts by their parliaments have been firmly established in law.

However it was reaffirmed that command of the army remained with the king even though parliament exercised significant, one could say overwhelming, influence because of its control of the purse strings. Whilst William III was a competent soldier and well capable of commanding an army, and his sister-in-law Anne was strongly supported by her famous general, John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, the Hanoverian kings were not so blessed. It is worth noting though that George II distinguished himself at the Battle of Oudenarde in 1708 and was the last monarch to command his troops in the field, at Dettingen in 1743.

It was in the eighteenth century that British arms achieved sound success. They saw to the crushing of the Jacobite insurrection at Culloden in 1746, the securing of British India after Plassey in 1757 and the ultimate victory in the Seven Years War. The capture of Quebec in 1759 was an outstanding achievement in that most difficult of tasks, an amphibious operation by night.

It can be reasonably be concluded that not only had Britain produced capable naval and military commanders, but the king was astute enough to appoint them. He certainly had sound advice from his secretaries of state, Walpole and Pitt.

George III on the other hand, had no such luck on either score before 1781. His naval and military appointments in America were, with one or two exceptions, quite disastrous. In 1793, with war looming against revolutionary France, it seemed that the king's power of appointment and dismissal of officers was being used for political ends, something that had undermined the campaign during the American Revolution. The government moved to put the matter in order. A commander-in-chief was appointed, to advise the king on military matters. He was to be primarily a military man and outside politics.

At the same time the dispositions and administration of the army had more and more fallen into the purview of a civilian political official, who became a member of parliament and the cabinet, eventually having the title Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. To the extent that this reflected the situation at the Admiralty, it was all to the good. In any event, neither George III nor the Prince Regent could exercise unfettered authority. Success in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was quite probably due, at least in some part, to this overarching arrangement.

The duality of these arrangements remained until the Crimean War when the colonies were split off from the portfolio under a separate Secretary of State.

In 1888 the Orders in Council were revised and the whole administration of the army was centred in the Commander-in-Chief who was himself responsible to the Secretary of State for War.

The office of Commander-in-Chief was abolished after the Boer War in 1904, when Army Council was established. All powers exercised under royal prerogative by the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief were vested in the Council which was presided over by the Secretary of State and included the Chief of the General Staff.

The Concept of the Joint Force became prominent in both Britain and Australia in the latter part of the twentieth century. Gradually the old system of single service command and control changed and the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council, the Naval and Military Boards in Australia disappeared. But the services remain. The prerogatives of the crown, administered through and on the advice of the government of the day have not changed.

THE POSITION OF THE MONARCH

Where then does this leave the monarch (king or queen) in this present day system?

Under all the multitudinous acts of parliament and within the limits they set, notwithstanding that she may personally hold, from time to time, the title of Lord High Admiral or Colonel of a host of regiments and corps within the army, or that many of her functions as sovereign are exercised in Australia by a Governor General under the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the command, government and disposition of the navy and the army, and by extension the air force, reside in the sovereign.

It will never be clear how this can be so to those who lack an understanding of this curious, perhaps even paradoxical, phenomenon we call the Westminster System of Government. Certainly in 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, could never understand it. So much of it has been lost in the sands of time over the period of 1300 years it has taken to evolve. Some of it is determined by statute, some by custom and practice, some simply by commonsense.

Much of it stems from an ancient characteristic of the British people; that every individual is a legal person and has an inalienable right to live a life of his or her own choosing, so long as he/she does not hurt anyone else; that he/she must not be dictated to nor oppressed; but that when this society is threatened, he/she has both the right and the obligation to defend it.

This is the meaning of freedom. The British have chosen to articulate this right in the concept of the Crown, since the monarch is given the responsibility to protect and defend the people of the realm. The Crown embodies the union of Monarch and People. As such it is a symbol of nationhood. If it is necessary to confirm this, one only has to look at the Coronation Oath.

The fact that the armed forces are headed by the sovereign acknowledges the dual right and responsibility of the sovereign under the law. It recognises that the forces are to serve the people and remain at the disposal of the state. Supreme legislative authority rests with the Crown in Parliament. Supreme governing authority resides with the Crown in Council. Supreme judicial authority lies with the courts of the Crown.

More than this though, the Crown serves as a symbol of the Nation, i.e. the people and the commonweal, the common or public good.

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1. The principal source of legal and constitutional information in this essay is FW Maitland, *The Constitutional History of England*, Cambridge University Press, 1909. Or available at <https://archive.org/stream/constitutionalh00mait#page/n23/mode/2up> Quotations are from this publication unless otherwise indicated.
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PHILIP CAREY

BOOK REVIEW

ANZAC TREASURES

The Gallipoli Collection of the AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL


By Peter Pedersen

Murdock Books, 421pp, RRP \$.69.00 (hard cover)

With the approaching centenary of the ANZAC landing it is a given that readers will be offered a wide range of material dealing with the subject. Dr Pedersen, the Head of the National Collection Branch of the Australian War Memorial is a person well placed to write on the brilliant collection of memorabilia held in the Memorial's collection. The work therefore in the first place is a catalogue of the items held in the collection. It is however much more than that. The book opens with some remarks on how the collection was put together noting that the narrative was descriptive of an "ill-conceived" campaign. Any student of the subject will be aware that both the founding of the collection and the writing of the Official History are closely related and bear the stamp of Charles Bean. For that reason an account of Bean's working methods is given including reference to the 700 photographs he took during the campaign and his notebooks. The first entry in his notebook records his saying goodbye to his mother at Port Melbourne. That was the first of more than 20,000 pages of notes. Bean returned to Gallipoli in 1918 leading an Historical Mission accompanied by George Lambert whose paintings are part of the collection.

The work is divided into chapters descriptive of the various stages of the campaign. Those chapters include: the Landing, Holding On, Krithia, life at ANZAC, the August Offensive and the Evacuation. In this review it is not proposed to follow that sequence but to deal with particular aspects of the work separately. First and perhaps the most impressive aspect of the work (depending on one's point of view) is the documentary material reproduced, then the high quality photographs of the artefacts displayed, details of the personalities and finally the campaign itself.

The documents comprise maps, photographs, letters, paintings and military documents. All are clearly reproduced and easy to read. The maps however have been reduced in scale and readers may need to have to recourse to a magnifying glass (as your reviewer did). The maps included those of Liman von Sanders, Colonel Monash (displaying his legendary attention to detail), Colonel MacLaurin and maps used by the Turks. The photographs reproduced give a vivid view of life on Gallipoli. Many were taken by Bean however the bulk were taken by soldiers who carried Kodak VPK cameras promoted by the manufacturer as "the soldier's Kodak".



There were no official photographers to the campaign. Every aspect of life at the front was depicted including life in the trenches, individuals, the war in progress, a latrine in use and the impossible terrain. A series of images depict famous armistice to bury the dead. There are images and explanatory text dealing with some of the heroes including Albert Jacka and Simpson. The letters and military documents are reproduced with great clarity and are easily read. Most are handwritten and the quality of the handwriting is impressive. The letters from the soldiers home portrayed discomfort, determination and homesickness. The message sent by the Sydney after sinking the Emden was to the point "Emden beached and done for." Many of the now famous paintings of George Lambert and Ellis Silas are beautifully reproduced, some printed on three pages that fold out.

The photographs of the artefacts in the collection are faithfully reproduced and extensive. Two of the most popular items in the collection are lifeboats used to bring the soldiers ashore. The boats still have the bullet holes sustained in the landing. Included are details of the both allied and Turkish soldier's kits, bugles, water bottles, whistles and signal flags. The fascinating display of military hardware includes, artillery pieces from both sides, trench mortars, the legendary Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (.303), Vickers and Maxim Machine Guns and the German Mauser rifle used by the Turks. A pristine image of a Furphy's water cart reminds us of the peculiarities of the English language as spoken in Australia!

The book does not purport to be an history of the ANZAC Campaign but in the giving of the detailed provenance of the material on display it is inevitable that a good deal of the Anzac story is rehearsed. This often presents some unique insights into the persons involved.

Bean is quoted as the source of an unflattering portrait of Major General Bridges complemented by unstinting praise for his Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Brudenell White. Bean thought the Australian Billy Sing “the most efficient sniper at Anzac.” The English war correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett was described as a “chronic gambler, serial womanizer, [and a] perpetually broke epicure”. Even so, we have him to thank for the first account of the landing at Anzac Cove and the only cinematic record of the campaign. Birdwood was skeptical about Monash’s ability as a field commander “as he did not cut a good figure on horseback”! The photographs suggest that Monash was not exactly svelte.

As to the campaign itself there is comprehensive information on engagements at Lone Pine, The Nec and Krithia. The discussion here is supported by paintings, photographs, diaries and artifacts collected from the

battlefield. The attack at Krithia was to be accompanied “with bands playing and colours flying” but luckily this was not possible because the instruments and flags had been left behind. At the end of the book many of the recruitment posters are included.

The book is outstanding, printed on high quality gloss paper to display the photographs and holographic material to their best. The work includes a comprehensive endnotes and a detailed index. The danger with a work such as this is that it lends itself to display as a coffee table book. This would be a shame as the text and images are highly informative and well worth reading. In addition I would think the book an excellent reference book. There should be a copy in every municipal and school library.

JOHN TWYFORD

BOOK REVIEW

1177 BC THE YEAR THAT CIVILIZATION COLLAPSED

By Eric H Cline

Princeton University Press, 237pp, RRP \$29.95 (hard cover)


This book discusses one of the most mystifying episodes in ancient history. It concerns the destruction of the civilization on the shores of the Mediterranean by invaders from the sea known to history as the ‘Sea Peoples’. The title of the book is the date of the defeat of invaders from the sea by King Ramses III in a battle at the Nile Delta. This is recorded in an inscription on the wall of Ramses mortuary temple at Medinet Habu.

Other references are found in the Harris Papyrus also found at Medinet Habu and on a reference by Merneptah on the famous Israel stela. The sea peoples left no record of their own and we are almost entirely dependent on Egyptian references. The fact is that many of the cities of the eastern Mediterranean were destroyed about the same time signaling the end of the Late Bronze Age.

The first issue discussed is: who were the Sea Peoples? One group of candidates is the Biblical Philistines from Crete. Others included the Tjekker, Shekelesh, Shardana and Danuna. Some may have travelled by land. Associated with this question is whether they were an organized group of marauders or refugees fleeing disaster seeking new lands?

During the period there is evidence that the fabric of society was weakening. In Egypt the Harem Conspiracy ended in the murder of Ramses III. There is evidence that Troy VIIA was destroyed by fire after being besieged. Arrowheads and bodies were found and it is speculated that this may have been the work of the Sea Peoples rather than the Mycenaeans!

The widespread destruction during the period may have a number of causes and Sea Peoples may not have been solely responsible. It may have been that the Sea Peoples did no more than accelerate the demise of declining societies.



Economic and political theories have been put forward to explain the collapse of the Late Bronze Age societies. One suggestion is that the transition from the command economies entailed in kingship to private entrepreneurship played a part in the sea peoples appearance. Much the same outcome could come from internal rebellion, climate change, earthquake or a combination of these factors. These possibilities have been characterized by scholars as Systems Collapse or Complexity Theory triggering a domino effect.

The author concludes that it is not possible to determine with certainty what caused the transition from the Late Bronze Age to the Iron Age. His work however canvasses all of the possibilities. The work is a fascinating read, especially for those of us who are interested in ancient history. The discussion takes in many interesting asides including Nefertiti, Tutankhamen and the work of Howard Carter. The book is beautifully produced illustrated with the black and white line drawings used in academic papers. This is supplemented by a collection of black and white photographs. Finally as one would expect the work concludes with comprehensive endnotes, bibliography and endnotes.

JOHN TWYFORD

BOOK REVIEW

WAR SINCE 1945

By **Jeremy Black**

Reaktion Books London, 216pp

This little book by Jeremy Black, Professor of History at the University of Exeter, UK, is one of the series Contemporary Worlds, produced by Reaktion and which explores the present and the recent past. The series takes as its distinctive theme, geo-political entities and cultural groups, and explores their development over a period, usually the last fifty years.

The series studies the impact of current events and developments with a view to unveiling the cultural, political, religious and technological forces that are reshaping the world today. This book presents a rapid but clear process of interpretation, as Black says, intended '... to provide a short and accessible introduction to war since 1945.'

It is a timely exercise in which he admonishes us to review the sixty nine years since the end of the Second World War and to see the events of that time in a newer and brighter light, for they compose a different paradigm than the one we have traditionally used.


In the aftermath of the Second World War two interlocking phenomena came to prevail over the international political and military environment, the Cold War and Decolonisation. The former resulted from the clash of ideologies between the USA and her allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and her spreading area of influence on the other.

The Cold War is described by Professor Black as '... the great ideological and "super-power" stand off between capitalism and Communism, and their leaders, the USA and the Soviet Union, that lasted from the close of World War II until the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s.' Two new empires based on ideology rather than territory.

Decolonisation was brought about largely because the old European imperial powers had demonstrated their inability to protect and maintain their territorial empires in the face of Japanese and, to a lesser extent, German expansionism.

Crucially they had all reached their point of overstretch, but they were vulnerable to a sinister pressure from both the new empires. As we know, the process of decolonisation was sponsored by the USA and Soviet Union, and actively prosecuted by the United Nations Organisation, often to the blatant exclusion of any other issue.

Professor Black's work is both timely and provocative. It challenges the predominant thesis of the Cold War with its insidious corollary, an arms race that bred Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); the paradigm of a power and conflict approach to warfare, with the related assumption that a particular operational method and/or type of technology would lead to profound increases in military capability and assure success.



Acknowledging that many historians, commentators and strategists continued to place their trust in this paradigm, even into the present time, he points out that most of the wars we have seen since 1945 have been very different in type from the conflicts we saw in World War II and anticipated thereafter. They usually involved an element of insurrection. In fact these were conflicts of decolonisation, a phenomenon quite separate from the Cold War, but closely entwined with it. The process of decolonisation, he says, fuelled the Cold War.

Black contends that it is misleading to see warfare only in the light of the Cold War model. He prefers instead to consider the diversity of military force structures, methods, goals and cultures that have really characterised wars in the last sixty years, especially in the developing world.

In presenting his thesis Black includes five perceptive chapters discussing all the conflicts in the period, under headings that describe their nature and origins rather than a chronological account that could lead us back to a Cold War focus.

The descriptive chapters entitled: "Aftermath Conflicts", including the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War; "Wars of Decolonisation", including the Malayan Emergency and the French wars in Indo China and Algeria; "Cold War Conflicts", in particular the Vietnam War and the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan; "Cold War Confrontations", which discusses the general progress of the standoff until the collapse of the Soviet Union; and "Wars between Non-Western Powers", which covers Africa, South Asia and the Middle East conflicts; constitute an excellent analysis of wars since 1945. His last two chapters, "Searching for a New World Order since 1990" and "Conclusions" provide the keys to his thoughts.

These are the chapters that consider the present day in the light of conflicts in Kosovo, Rwanda, Somalia, Chechnya and not least, the two Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, where American strategic planning was so awry. Here Black discusses the complexity and diversity of factors that impact upon the thinking of military planners and their political masters alike. He stresses the importance of harmonising political goals with military objectives, of considered tasking of military forces, and of bringing their structure into line with the tasks given to them. Drawing out the differences between symmetric warfare and an asymmetric threat, he exhorts us to be more flexible and broad ranging in our approach to both structure and role. The War on Terror will require an intellectual rigour not necessarily experienced before.

Professor Black acknowledges the importance of technological advancement in the means of making war and the 'Revolution in Military Affairs', but warns against an absolute reliance on these developments when confronted with asymmetric challenges and a questionable "will to win" on the part of national opinion, discordant media and the denigration of Western culture and military tradition. Perhaps an unwillingness to endure casualties could endanger Western civilisation.

This is an interesting and provocative book. It is written in an academic vein and can be hard to read at times. It lacks a bibliography but it has an index and endnotes. It must be useful reading for those who seek to appreciate the reasoning behind some of the latter day public statements by military leaders of the West, particularly by American generals seeking to account for the US failures in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

PHILIP CAREY

FROM THE PUBLISHER

Since this is the last issue of *Reconnaissance* before Christmas I would like to take the opportunity of wishing our members the compliments of the season. In addition I express my gratitude to those people who have helped to produce *Reconnaissance*. Of signal importance are our contributors and here I thank Brigadier Philip Carey, Mr Joe Crumlin and Mr David Twyford for their contributions.

The purpose of the publication is to maintain communication with our members and to bring to their attention matters of significance in our pursuit of knowledge about military history. I hope we do this well. In the preparation of *Reconnaissance* we are indebted to Ms Myra Nikolich for her Herculean effort in carrying out the desktop publishing – a task well beyond my capabilities.

In the book review of this publication we publish a review by Brigadier Carey of a book entitled *War Since 1945*.

It is some time since the book was first published, however, Brigadier Carey's review is in itself an illuminating essay on the changing nature of war. For our members who are interested the book is still in print and available through Abbeyes and from the UK Publisher.

Next year we are planning big things for the publication and I again exhort those of our members who would like to have something to say to contact me. We are interested in both short pieces and longer in-depth discussions of issues of military history. This can be in the form of a review of a book you have read or an account of a personal experience. By personal experience I include family history. Those of our members who I know to have literary skills can expect a tap on the shoulder from me!

Members are reminded that the November issue of Dr Kevin Smith's *Sandakan* newsletter is now available and may be obtained by contacting Dr Smith at kevin.robert6@bigpond.com.

JOHN TWYFORD